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We consider the cloning of sequences of qubits prepared in the states used in the BB84 or 6-
state quantum cryptography protocol, and show that the single-qubit fidelity is unaffected even
if entire sequences of qubits are prepared in the same basis. This result is of great importance
for practical quantum cryptosystems because it reduces the need for high-speed random number
generation without impairing on the security against finite-size attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum cryptography [1, 2, 3] is based
on two main ingredients. The first refers to the im-
possibility of perfectly cloning some unknown quantum
state selected from a nonorthogonal set [4]. As a re-
sult, the potential eavesdropper Eve cannot clone the
quantum state transmitted by Alice and re-transmit it
undisturbed to the receiver Bob. The second ingredi-
ent, although often mentioned only implicitly in the lit-
terature, is also an absolute requirement: truly random
numbers must be available on both Alice’s and Bob’s
sides. Indeed, with pseudo-random number generators,
the sequence of choices made by Alice and Bob could
in principle be predicted by Eve if the seed is known to
her. Clearly, quantum cryptography should use quantum
randomness. But, in practice, this is a severe constraint
because a complete protocol requires a huge amount of
random numbers, from Alice’s state choices to Bob’s ba-
sis choices, as well as for the random choices and random
permutations needed in error correction and privacy am-
plification. Making high-speed quantum random-number
generators is a big technological challenge, so that most
realizations of quantum cryptography today rely on an
active [15] choice that uses a standard random-number
generator. It is therefore of a great importance to in-
vestigate whether this requirement of high-rate random
number generation can be relaxed, at least in part.
In this paper, we consider a variant of the BB84 [1]
or six-state [5, 6] protocols in which the basis chosen
for encoding is kept unchanged over long sequences of
qubits instead of being drawn at random for each qubit.
We show that, quite surprisingly, the security is unaf-
fected by this modification of the protocol although the
random number generation rate is significantly reduced.
The BB84 and six-state protocols are amongst the cryp-
tographic schemes for which the security has exhaustively
been studied. In various cases the optimal eavesdrop-
ping strategy has been found explicitly [5, 6, 7], and was
shown to coincide with approximate cloning [8]. For this
reason, we restrict our analysis to cloning-based attacks
in the following.
We consider the cloning of sequences of N qubits. In
each sequence the qubits are prepared in the same basis,
but the state is chosen at random among the basis states
[16]. This is viewed as the optimal eavesdropping attack
against a quantum cryptographic protocol in which we
do not restrict Alice and Bob to make random choices
of bases for every qubit, but allow them to use the same
basis for the entire length-N sequence (N is assumed to
be publicly known). That is, for each sequence, Alice
and Bob make new and independent random choices of
bases. At first sight, one could imagine that this encod-
ing would increase Eve’s knowledge about the secret key,
but we shall see that for the class of cloning transforma-
tions we have studied, this is not the case: Eve’s optimal
cloning attack provides her with no more Shannon in-
formation, for a given quantum bit error rate, than in
the usual case where Alice and Bob make random basis-
choices for each qubit and Eve applies a cloning attack
on each qubit. Under the assumption that this class of
approximate cloning transformations corresponds to the
optimal eavesdropping strategy, we have thus proven that
the requirement for random number generation can be
reduced without impairing on the security against finite-
size attacks [9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we de-
scribe a general formalism for quantum cloning [10, 11],
and adapt it to the case of interest here. In Sections III
and IV, we apply this formalism to 2-qubit cloning at-
tacks in the BB84 and six-state protocols, respectively,
and show that using the same bases does not affect the
cloning fidelity. Section V contains a generalization of
these results in dimensions being any power of two. Fi-
nally, in Section VI, we summarize our results.
2II. GENERAL QUANTUM CLONING
FORMALISM
We refer to a general class of cloning transformations
as defined in Refs. [10, 11]. Considering an arbitrary
state |ψ〉 in a 2N -dimensional Hilbert space, we wish to
produce two (approximate) clones. The class of cloning
transformations we will analyze is built following the
”Cerf ansatz”: if the input state is |ψ〉, then the resulting
joint state of the two output clones (noted E and B) and
the cloning machine (noted C) is:
|ψ〉 →
2N−1∑
−
m,n=0
am,nUm,n|ψ〉E |Bm,n〉B,C
=
2N−1∑
m,n=0
bm,nUm,n|ψ〉B|Bm,n〉E,C (1)
where the couple {m,n} ⇔ {m1 . . .mN , n1 . . . nN} and
mi, ni ∈ {0, 1}. Here, E, B and C are 2N -dimensional
systems and Um,n is defined as
Um,n =
N⊗
i=1
XmiZni . (2)
whereXmiZni represents the identity and the three Pauli
matrices
X0Z0 = I
X1Z0 = σx
X0Z1 = σz
X1Z1 = −iσy.
Here, |Bm,n〉 is defined as
|Bm,n〉 =
2N−1∑
k=0
(−1)(k·n)|k〉|k +m〉 (3)
where k · n represents the bitwise scalar product, i.e.
k · n = ∑i kini. Thus, Um,n is the tensor product of
N Pauli matrices each acting on a two-dimensional sub-
system. An error operator Umi,ni is associated to each
subsystem. Such an operator shifts the state by mi
units (modulo 2) in the computational basis, and mul-
tiplies it by a phase so as to shift its Fourier transform
by ni units (modulo 2). Eq. (3) defines the d
2 general-
ized Bell states for a pair of 2N -dimensional systems with
|Bm,n〉 = Um,n ⊗ I |B0,0〉.
Tracing over systems B and C (or E and C) yields the
final states of clone E (or clone B): if the input state is
|ψ〉, the clones E and B are in a mixture of the states
|ψm,n〉 = Um,n|ψ〉 with respective weights pm,n and qm,n:
ρE =
2N−1∑
m,n=0
pm,n|ψm,n〉〈ψm,n|
ρB =
2N−1∑
m,n=0
qm,n|ψm,n〉〈ψm,n| (4)
In addition, the weight functions of the two clones (pm,n
and qm,n) are related by
pm,n = |am,n|2, qm,n = |bm,n|2, (5)
where am,n and bm,n are two (complex) amplitude func-
tions that are dual under N two-dimensional Fourier
transforms:
bm,n =
1
2N
2N−1∑
x,y=0
(−1)n·x−m·yax,y. (6)
The fidelity of a clone, say E, is given by
FE = 〈ψ|ρE |ψ〉 =
2N−1∑
m,n=0
|am,n|2|〈ψ|Um,n|ψ〉|2 (7)
and similarly for the B clone (replace the |am,n|2 term
by |bm,n|2).
III. BB84 PROTOCOL WITH 2-QUBIT
CORRELATED BASES
In this section we compare the amount of information
that can be gained by Eve when performing a cloning at-
tack on individual qubits (two-dimensional) and on pairs
of qubits (four-dimensional) which may have been chosen
from correlated bases. We study here how this affects the
BB84 protocol and in the next section we move on to the
six-state protocol.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice chooses from states be-
longing to two mutually unbiased bases. Two bases A
and B for a d-dimensional system are said to be MU [12]
if a state prepared in any element of A (such as |A,α〉)
has a uniform probability distribution of being found in
any element of B, namely
|〈A,α|B, β〉| = 1√
d
. (8)
Conventionally, Alice and Bob choose the first basis
as the so-called computational basis (eigenstates of σz)
{|0〉, |1〉} and the second as the dual basis (eigenstates of
σx) { 1√2 (|0〉 ± |1〉)}.
A. BB84 - single qubit attack - no basis correlation
If Eve chooses to clone the qubits individually, she
must use a cloning strategy which is optimal for this set
3of states. When using the cloning formalism described
in Sec. I, one can easily verify that the expression of the
fidelity for all states of a given basis is the same. The
reader familiar with this calculation can easily skip to
the next subsection without any loss of generality. Here
and throughout the paper, we consider fidelities as ex-
pressed by Eq. (7). Particularly for Eve’s clone one
finds that the fidelity for the computational basis is FE =
|a0,0|2+ |a0,1|2 and the dual basis is FE = |a0,0|2+ |a1,0|2.
A cloning machine that acts equally well for this set of
states implies |a0,0|2 + |a0,1|2 = |a0,0|2 + |a1,0|2. Since
there is a priori no reason why the optimal values of
these elements be different from each other, we make the
hypothesis that they should all be equal and real. Fur-
thermore, we extend our hypothesis to the remaining ele-
ment, |a1,1|2 such that the form of the amplitude matrix
reduces to:
am,n =
(
v x
x y
)
. (9)
Eve’s fidelity is now expressed as FE = v
2 + x2 and nor-
malization requires v2+2x2+y2 = 1. Bob’s clone can be
characterized by a similar amplitude matrix by making
the same hypotheses:
bm,n =
(
v′ x′
x′ y′
)
, (10)
where the different matrix elements are related to the
am,n coefficients by Eq. (6). Thus, Bob’s fidelity is
FB = v
′2 + x′2 in both bases and the corresponding mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob (if the latter
measures his clone in the good basis) is given by
IAB = 1 + FB log2 FB + (1− FB) log2(1− FB). (11)
Maximizing Eve’s fidelity FE for a given value of Bob’s
fidelity FB under the normalization constraint yields
v =
1
2
+
√
FB(1− FB)
x = FB − 1
2
y =
1
2
−
√
FB(1− FB)
such that the corresponding optimal fidelity for Eve is
FE =
FB
2
+
1− FB
2
+
√
FB(1− FB). (12)
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s theorem [13] provides a lower bound
on the rate R at which Alice and Bob can generate secret
key bits using privacy amplification:
R ≥ max(IAB − IAE , IAB − IBE) , (13)
where IAE and IBE represent the mutual information
between Alice and Eve, and Bob and Eve respectively.
It is therefore a sufficient condition that IAB > IAE in
order to establish a secret key with non-zero rate for one
way communication channels. It has been shown in [8]
that Bob and Eve’s information curves intersect exactly
where the fidelities coincide because, in this particular
case, the mutual information shared between Alice and
Eve is also expressed by Eq. (11). This yields the optimal
symmetric fidelity of phase covariant cloning [14]
FE = FB =
1
2
+
1√
8
≃ 0.8536. (14)
Note that this result is independent of the fact that Al-
ice may have chosen to encode sequences of consecutive
qubits in the same basis since Eve is intercepting them
individually.
B. BB84 - two qubit attack - no correlation
Suppose now that Eve intercepts the qubits in se-
quences of two and clones them. We make the same
assumption as before, namely that Alice has randomly
chosen the basis she has encoded her qubit with. We
would like to know if Eve can gain more information per
qubit using this cloning approach as opposed to cloning
them individually. Our first task is to determine the set of
states that she will have to clone. If Alice chooses among
the computational and dual bases, the possible sequences
Eve might encounter are products of eigenstates of σ⊗2z :
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉, products of eigenstates of σ⊗2x :
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉),
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉),
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉),
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉),
and products between eigenstates of these two bases (σz⊗
σx and σx ⊗ σz):
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |01〉) , 1√
2
(|10〉 ± |11〉)
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |10〉) , 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |11〉).
Because we are now dealing with a four-dimensional
Hilbert space (N = 2) with tensor product structure,
the Um,n operators take the following form:
Um1m2;n1n2 =
(
I Z
X Y
)
⊗
(
I Z
X Y
)
Each of these matrix elements consists in a tensor prod-
uct of two Pauli operators each acting on an associated
qubit. Eve is interested in the information she can gain
from a single qubit when she clones them in sequences
4of two. In other words, Eve is interested in the opti-
mal four-dimensional cloning map where the figure of
merit is not the single-clone four-dimensional fidelity
but rather the single-clone, single-qubit two-dimensional
fidelity averaged over the two qubits. To obtain this fi-
delity, we must trace over the second qubit subsystem
and compute the fidelity of the first qubit, repeat this
operation for the second qubit by tracing out the first
qubit subsystem and finally average over the two fideli-
ties. For example, the reduced density matrix of the first
qubit for Eve’s clone is expressed as:
ρ1E = Tr2
[ ∑
m,n
|am,n|2Xm1Zn1 |φ1〉〈φ1|Zn1Xm1
⊗ Xm2Zn2 |φ2〉〈φ2|Zn2Xm2
]
=
∑
m,n
|am,n|2Xm1Zn1 |φ1〉〈φ1|Zn1Xm1
where |φi〉 is a two-dimensional system. For sequences of
qubits both drawn from eigenstates of σz the fidelity is
F 1E,zz =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2|〈φ1|Xm1Zn1 |φ1〉|2
=
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δm1,0 (15)
for the first qubit and
F 2E,zz =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2|〈φ2|Xm2Zn2 |φ2〉|2
=
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δm2,0 (16)
for the second qubit. For clusters of qubits both drawn
from eigenstates of σx the fidelity is
F 1E,xx =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δn1,0 (17)
for the first qubit and
F 2E,xx =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δn2,0 (18)
for the second qubit. To be complete, we must also com-
pute the fidelity for clusters expressed as tensor prod-
ucts drawn from eigenstates of σz ⊗ σx and σx ⊗ σz.
The former yields F 1E,zx = F
1
E,zz for the first qubit
and F 2E,zx = F
2
E,xx for the second qubit. The latter
yields a fidelity of F 1E,xz = F
1
E,xx for the first qubit and
F 2E,xz = F
2
E,zz for the second qubit. The expressions for
these fidelities F iE can easily be interpreted as follows.
Every single-qubit fidelity consists in a sum of eight terms
for which the first four express the fidelity of the four-
dimensional system in question (in other words the con-
tribution from the am,n coefficients where no errors occur
on either qubits) while the remaining four terms corre-
spond to the am,n coefficients for which the i
th qubit is
not affected by an error but the remaining one is. Gen-
erally, the fidelity of the ith qubit is expressed as
F iE = F4E +D
i
E (19)
where F4E is the fidelity of the four-dimensional sys-
tem and DiE is the disturbance of the i
th qubit and is
expressed as
DiE =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δmi,1 δm¬i,0 (20)
for qubits drawn from the computational basis and
DiE =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δni,1 δn¬i,0 (21)
for qubits drawn from the dual basis. Here, the qubit of
the pair which is not the ith qubit is given the index ¬i.
The average qubit fidelity of Eve’s clone is therefore:
FE = F4E +
1
2
(D1E +D
2
E). (22)
A similar analysis can be made for Bob’s clone from
which we obtain a single-qubit fidelity
FB = F4B +
1
2
(D1B +D
2
B) (23)
which is function of the bm,n coefficients. We are again
interested in the mutual information shared between Al-
ice and Bob and Alice and Eve. To do this, let us first
compute Eve’s optimal fidelity FE for a fixed value of
Bob’s fidelity FB under the normalization constraint
3∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2 = 1 (24)
and the constraint that the single-qubit fidelity be the
same for all 16 considered input states. The optimization
yields the following am,n matrix:
am,n =
(
v1 x1
x1 y1
)
⊗
(
v2 x2
x2 y2
)
(25)
where
v1 = v2 =
1
2
+
√
FB(1 − FB)
x1 = x2 = FB − 1
2
y1 = y2 =
1
2
−
√
FB(1− FB)
5such that
FE =
FB
2
+
1− FB
2
+
√
FB(1− FB). (26)
From the previous subsection we know that Bob and
Eve’s information curves intersect exactly where the fi-
delities coincide. This implies that Alice and Bob can
share secret bits via privacy amplification as long as
FB > FE , that is
FB >
1
2
+
1√
8
.
This optimal symmetric fidelity turns out to be the same
as the optimal fidelity obtained when the cloner is de-
signed for two-dimensional systems meaning that the
optimal four-dimensional cloning map for single-qubit
single-clone fidelity boils down to the tensor product of
the two-dimensional optimal cloners.
C. BB84 - two qubit attack - correlated bases
Now consider the situation where Alice is limited by
her random number generator and must therefore send
two consecutive states drawn from the same basis in or-
der to keep a decent cadence [9]. Of course if Eve inter-
cepts every qubit individually, the fidelity she obtains af-
ter cloning is just the same as before, namely F = 12+
1√
8
.
If she intercepts them in sequences of two qubits she will
necessarily find that they are correlated: either she ex-
pects to find two qubits drawn from the computational
basis σz (equivalently, a four dimensional state drawn
from the eigenstates of σz⊗σz) or two qubits drawn from
the dual basis σx (equivalently, a four dimensional state
drawn from the eigenstates of σx ⊗ σx). Compared to
the previous situation where no correlation was present,
the set of input states Eve has to consider has now de-
creased. Intuitively we should expect that the optimal
single-qubit cloner would give rise to a higher fidelity.
We shall see that this is not the case.
The cloner we consider is again characterized by the
”Cerf ansatz” (1) such that the single-qubit fidelity for
this set of input states is defined exactly like Eqs. (15)
and (16) for eigenstates of σz and like Eqs. (17) and
(18) for eigenstates of σx. These are the four expressions
of the fidelity for which the am,n (and consequently the
bm,n) coefficients must be optimized for. The constraints
we must consider here are the normalization constraint
and the constraint that these four expressions be equal.
Of course, these fidelities are again characterized by Eq.
(22). Interestingly, the constrained optimization yields
am,n coefficients which have exactly the same form as
Eq. (25) and therefore the same expressions for Eve’s
fidelity as a function of Bob’s. Once again, the lower
bound on the mutual information Alice and Bob must
share in order to generate a secret key is given by
F >
1
2
+
1√
8
.
We conclude that even if Alice chooses to encode two con-
secutive states in the same basis, Eve’s optimal cloning
strategy does not permit her to gain more information
than complete random choices. In Section V we will gen-
eralize this idea for sequences of N qubits, but first let
us examine how these cloning strategies apply to the six-
state protocol.
IV. SIX-STATE PROTOCOL WITH 2-QUBIT
CORRELATED BASES
The six-state protocol is very similar to the BB84 pro-
tocol, the only difference being that Alice now has the
choice to pick up states from a third basis MU to the
other two. Again, let us choose the first two bases as the
computational basis and the dual basis and let the third
basis be the eigenstates of σy: { 1√2 (|0〉 ± i|1〉)}.
A. six-state - single qubit attack - no correlation
The cloner that must be used for the six-state proto-
col is an asymmetric two-dimensional universal cloner [8]
characterized by the same amplitude matrix as Eq. (9)
except that we make the change y = x:
am,n =
(
v x
x x
)
.
Eve’s fidelity is expressed as FE = v
2 + x2 and normal-
ization requires v2+3x2 = 1. Maximizing her fidelity for
a fixed value of Bob’s fidelity yields the optimal cloner:
v =
√
3FB − 1
2
x =
√
1− FB
2
.
Bob’s clone is characterized by a similar amplitude ma-
trix:
bm,n =
(
v′ x′
x′ x′
)
, (27)
where as before, v′ and x′ are given by Eq. (6) while the
mutual information he shares with Alice by Eq. (11). It
has been shown in [8] that the mutual information shared
between Alice and Eve for the six-state protocol is given
by
IAE = 1 + (FB + FE − 1) log2(
FB + FE − 1
FB
)
+ (1− FE) log2(
1− FE
FB
) (28)
such that for a given FB , IAE is lower than for the BB84
protocol which is consistent with the stronger require-
ment we put on that cloner. This implies that the fidelity
FB for which IAE = IAB is slightly lower, and equal to
FB ≃ 0, 8436.
6B. six-state - two qubit attack - no basis correlation
If Eve chooses to clone the incoming states in sequences
of two, the set of four-dimensional states she has to
clone consists of tensor products of states belonging to
the three maximally unbiased bases above. The single-
qubit fidelity is computed as above, with the exception
that there are extra constraints, namely that the fidelity
should also clone equally well eigenstates of σy:
F 1E,yy =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δm1,n1
for the first qubit and
F 2E,yy =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δm2,n2
for the second qubit. The other constraints come from
tensor products of σy⊗σz, σy⊗σx and vice-versa. The ex-
pression for the fidelity of the ith qubit can be expressed
as:
F iE = F4E +D
i
E (29)
where, for eigenstates of σy ,
DiE =
2N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|am,n|2δmi,ni+1 δm¬i,n¬i . (30)
The average qubit fidelity is again:
FE = F4E +
1
2
(D1E +D
2
E). (31)
As before a similar analysis can be made for Bob’s clone
from which we obtain a single-qubit fidelity
FB = F4B +
1
2
(D1B +D
2
B). (32)
We are again interested in the mutual information shared
between Alice and Bob, and Alice and Eve. We compute
Eve’s optimal fidelity FE for a fixed value of Bob’s fidelity
FB under the normalization constraint Eq.(24) and the
constraint that the single-qubit fidelity be the same for
all input states. The optimization yields the following
am,n matrix:
am,n =
(
v1 x1
x1 x1
)
⊗
(
v2 x2
x2 x2
)
(33)
where
v1 = v2 =
√
3FB − 1
2
x1 = x2 =
√
1− FB
2
such that
FE = 1− FB
2
+
1
4
√
6FB − 2
√
2− 2FB. (34)
In the previous subsection, we have seen how to express
IAB and IAE . Again in this case the lower bound on
Bob’s fidelity needed for IAB > IAE is given by FB >
0.8436 which is the same fidelity for individual attacks.
Thus, so far, we arrive to the same conclusions as for the
BB84 protocol.
C. six-state - two qubit attack - correlated bases
If Alice is again limited by her random number gener-
ator and must encode two consecutive qubits in the same
basis, Eve can clone the incoming states by sequences of
two expecting to find four-dimensional states expressed
as eigenstates of σz⊗σz, σx⊗σx or σy⊗σy. By making a
similar reasoning as in the previous subsection we arrive
to the same conclusions as before, namely that the infor-
mation Eve can gain when cloning a four-dimensional
system boils down to the optimal single qubit informa-
tion.
V. CLONING OF N-QUBIT SEQUENCES
We now proceed to generalize the cloning strategies
considered in the previous sections. We suppose that Al-
ice encodes her qubits using the same basis for sequences
of N qubits. We also suppose that N is much smaller
than the total size of the raw key she will be exchanging
with Bob. We also suppose that Eve is aware of when a
new sequence begins and ends.
Generally, for a sequence of N qubits, the reduced den-
sity matrix of the ith qubit for a given clone (say E) is
written as
ρiE = Trj 6=i
∑
m,n
|am,n|2
N⊗
j=1
XmjZnj |φj〉〈φj |ZnjXmj
=
∑
m,n
|am,n|2XmiZni |φi〉〈φi|ZniXmi, (35)
such that fidelity of the jth qubit is written as
F
j
E = FE2N +D
j
E (36)
and similarly for qubits of Bob’s clone. The average qubit
fidelity is therefore expressed as:
FE = FE2N +
1
N
N∑
i=1
DiE . (37)
If we assume that the optimal am,n amplitude matrices
are expressed as
am,n =
(
v x
x y
)⊗N
(38)
7for the BB84 protocol and
am,n =
(
v x
x x
)⊗N
(39)
for the six-state protocol, we can check that they indeed
satisfy a constrained optimization. Since the informa-
tion curves are both monotonically increasing functions
of the fidelities, we use the Lagrange multiplier method
to optimize Eve’s fidelity for a fixed value of Bob’s.
The constraint that the fidelity for different qubits in
the sequence be the same is already satisfied by the hy-
pothesized am,n matrix. The function is:
L = FE + λ1FB + λ2(
2N−1∑
m,n=0
|am,n|2 − 1)
=
1
N
N∑
m=0
(N −
N∑
i=1
mi)
N∏
i=1
(v2 + x2)mi⊕1(x2 + y2)mi
+ λ1
[ 1
N
N∑
m=0
(N −
N∑
i=1
mi)
N∏
i=1
(
1
2
+ vx+ xy)mi⊕1(
1
2
− vx− xy)mi]
+ λ2
[
(v2 + 2x2 + y2)N − 1] (40)
where the modular sum is in base 2. The equivalent
expression of Eq. (40) for the six-state protocol is very
similar except that one should exchange y2 for x2.
We have checked, using a symbolic calculator, that the
hypothesized amplitude matrices satisfy the constrained
optimization and yield the optimal fidelities (Eqs. (26)
and (34)) for N = 2 and N = 3.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered the cloning of sequences of N
qubits, where all the qubits in each sequence are prepared
in the same basis while each state is chosen at random.
This situation is very different from the usual scenario of
cloning multiple copies, where all the copies are prepared
in the same state. Our investigation was motivated by
the situation in quantum cryptography where the legiti-
mate users are required to make truly random choices for
each single qubit. From a practical point of view, this re-
quirement on high-speed random-number generation is a
severe constraint.
However, under the assumption that the class of
cloning transformations we considered here provides the
optimal eavesdropping strategy, we have shown that this
requirement can be relaxed, so that Alice can prepare
long sequences of qubits in the same basis without com-
promising the security. Surprisingly, Eve cannot exploit
her knowledge that the used basis is fixed for the entire
sequence, regardless of its length (provided it is much
shorter that the total key size). This result is quite im-
portant for practical applications of quantum cryptog-
raphy as it implies that higher secret-key rates may be
obtained using the same random number generator but
with this new modified protocol.
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